Utilizing the Consumer Expenditure Survey and state-level variation in taxes, this study nds that prices for most models of new cars shift by more than the amount of a sales tax. The evidence of an overshifting of prices oers support for the recent models of tax incidence in imperfectly competitive markets. The results also suggest that changes in the after-tax interest rate have osetting eects on new car prices; a one percentage point increase in the after-tax real interest rate will prompt, on average, a mark-down of $106.
Introduction
Oftentimes, the government attempts to inuence consumption patterns with its policy tools, including taxes and interest rates. Consumer spending on durable goodscan aect the overall health of the economy and, thus, it is useful to understand the link between these policy tools and durable good consumption. Ultimately, h o w ever, both the quantity consumed of a good and the price of agoodmay respond to government intervention; the results depend, at least in part, on the market characteristics of the goodin question. To completely grasp the impact of a government action on both consumers and producers requires an understanding of its impact on both prices and quantities. For example, an interest rate increase may not aect real motor vehicle sales if the automakers are able to counteract the rate increases with lower prices. Nonetheless, it would still not be true that the interest rate had no eect on the motor vehicle industry. To illuminate these eects, this study examines the relationships between taxes, interest rates and the price of a new car.
Empirical evidence relating policy to price remains sparse. The lack of empirical measures may force policymakers to evaluate a policy by relying on untested assumptions. For example, a Congressional Budget Oce [1992] study on the eect of adopting a value-added tax relies on standard perfect-competition assumptions that imply prices will increase by the same amount as a newly imposed sales tax. This study will focus on motor vehicle prices. I examine the motor-vehicle industry for several reasons: rst, motor vehicles are an important durable good;second, the performance of the industry has a signicant impact on the overall economy; third, the industry is likely to becharacterized by imperfect competition; nally, there is unusually rich data available for the industry. This paper establishes empirically the link between the cost of a new car and two distinct policy instruments, the sales tax and the after-tax real interest rate. Because both 1 interest rates and the tax deductions on interest payments inuence the eective after-tax real interest rate for consumers, the results may provide information that is pertinent for both monetary and scal policy.
Few studies address the relationship between taxes, interest rates and consumer durables. Mankiw [1982] and Bernanke [1985] consider models of durable good consumption with the assumption of a constant real after-tax interest rate. Mankiw [1985] relaxes this assumption somewhat, and measures the interest rate sensitivity of durable goodexpenditures using aggregate data, but assumes a constant marginal income tax rate of 0.3 percent. He nds that consumption of consumer durables is more sensitive to after-tax interest rates than of non-durables or services.
Using micro-level data and the cross-sectional variation in the tax code, I am able to determine whether the benets of an interest deduction or a lower interest rate pass through to the price of a new car. I nd that the price of a new car responds negatively to changes in the after-tax real interest rate. The parameter estimates suggest that a one percentage point increase in the after-tax real interest rate will prompt, on average, a mark-down of $106. This suggests that at least some of the benets of a reduction in the real after-tax interest rates pass through to the motor vehicle suppliers. In related work, Goolsbee [1995] nds that the benets of investment tax credits are passed through to the capital goods suppliers in the form of higher prices.
The public economics literature has focused on the incidence of taxation, or the eect of tax on price. The main thrust of this literature is that the dierence between the nominal and real burdens of taxation depends on the market characteristics and the relevant price elasticities. Until recently, the theoretical literature of sales tax incidence focused on two extreme cases, monopoly and perfect competition. Prices are typically expected to shift by just the amount of the tax in the case of perfect competition and by less than the amount of the tax in the case of monopoly. A recent extension of the theoretical literature focuses on the implications of imperfect competition for the incidence of a sales tax and nds that price shifts might dier markedly from the theories based on standard assumptions. 1 The primary results of this recent extension is that prices may overshift|i.e., shift up by more than the amount of the tax|in an imperfectly-competitive market. Besley [1989] considers the eects of taxation on the output perrm and the numberof rms in an imperfectly competitive market. He nds that, with taxation, aggregate output always falls when the number of rms is endogenous. As a result, Besley's model suggests that overshifting is more likely in markets where entry is possible, as it prompts a larger change in the price.
There have been few empirical studies testing the hypotheses about incidence. Sullivan [1985] and Sumner [1981] use their estimated eects of excise taxes to determine the competitiveness of the cigarette industry. Poterba [1994] reviews early empirical work and tests the link between sales tax rates and city-specic clothing prices. His results suggest that retail prices rise by just the amount of the sales tax. Besley and Rosen [1994] examine more disaggregate data that allows them to analyze the incidence of a sales tax for 15 specic goods, including products such as the Big Mac and Crisco shortening, for a panel of 155 cities. They do nd evidence of overshifting for some goods. A lack of specic information on market characteristics for the dierent products studied makes it more dicult to conrm that their range of results is exactly consistent with the theoretical literature.
Disparate results in the few empirical studies on sales tax incidence are not surprising given key dierences in the data, such as commodities and time periods. Therefore, an evaluation of the new theories, as suggested in Poterba [1994] , would require a more comprehensive picture with empirical evidence for several goods with a range of market characteristics. Typically, data preclude this kind of comprehensive study. In analyzing the motor vehicle industry, I am able to study an imperfectly competitive industry with well-studied market characteristics. 2 I nd robust evidence of an overshifting of sales taxes on the price of a new car. This evidence of overshifting in an imperfectly competitive market oers some support for the recent models of tax incidence in these markets, such as Besley [1989] .
Section 2 presents the empirical framework. Section 3 summarizes the data. The analysis utilizes a detailed micro survey, the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). The advantage of the CEX is that it provides extensive information on consumers, their state of residence, and their expenditures. Crucially, the CEX provides extremely detailed information on motor vehicle purchases, including model type, list price, actual price, special nancing, and additional options. Section 4 reports the main ndings. Section 5 considers various tests and extensions and Section 6 concludes.
Empirical Framework
Dierences in tax rates by state provides an exogenous variation to examine the relationship between taxes, interest rates, and the transaction price of a new car. A simple model of a motor vehicle purchase will serve to motivate the estimating equation. The model assumes that the observed price at which a motor vehicle sells is the result of bargaining between consumer and dealer.
Dene q m ist to bethe sales-tax-inclusive price for a car purchased by consumer i, dene p m ist to bethe sales-tax-exclusive price, and dene st to bethe sales-tax rate in the state of residence s of consumer i at time t. The prices are linked by the following identity: q m ist p m ist (1 + st ):
(1) Equation (1) (2) To take the simplest possible example, assume that consumer i is served by a monopoly car dealer, and the consumer and a dealer engage in Nash bargaining, resulting in the car model being purchased that maximizes total surplus from the transaction at a price that divides the gains from trade equally between the parties. Equating the consumer's and dealer's gains, V m (
where P V m ist is the present value of car payments (dierent from q m ist if the purchase is nanced with a loan). In general, the dealer's markup over marginal cost will depend on the degree of local competition between dealers and the degree of competition between 5 motor-vehicle manufacturers nationwide.
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Letting i bethe consumer's personal discount factor, if the price of the car is amortized over k periods we have
More generally, P V m ist = f(R st ) q m ist . Substituting equation (4) into equation (3), and substituting for q m ist from equation (1) and rearranging,
For estimation purposes, I use a linear specication as a rst-order approximation to the relationship described in equation (2). Linearizing equation (5) Equation (7) is comparable to that in Besley and Rosen [1994] , though here it is tailored to consumer level data. As noted in Besley and Rosen, this reduced-form approach a v oids some of the problematic assumptions of a more structural approach. Studies with structural models must make assumptions about the functional form of cost and demand.
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Note that this approach does not estimate an elasticity of demand.
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In analyzing the incidence of the sales tax, the estimate of 1 from equation (7) can be used to determine the extent that taxes are shifted to prices, in the manner described in Besley and Rosen [1994] . Let indicate the degree that taxes are overshifted into prices, the ultimate eect on q st from an excise tax. An increase in tax revenue, dx, raised from an excise tax, st on a motor vehicle purchase, will raise the tax-inclusive price, dq st , dq st dx = 1 + dp st =d p st + st (@p st =@ st ) = 1 + :
For small , the overshifting parameter, is
where p is the average price of a motor vehicle. Note that under standard monopoly assumptions, theory would predict that 1 , and thus would benegative, while under standard perfect competition assumptions, theory would predict that 1 , and thus would bezero. In an imperfectly competitive market, overshifting may occur and, in this case, both 1 and would be positive.
It is true that a variety of outcomes are possible in imperfectly competitive markets. According to the theoretical literature, the results depend on several factors, including the shape of the demand curve. As we know relatively little about the shape of demand curves, our conclusions about tax burdens must ultimately be drawn from empirical evidence. Nonetheless, the theoretical models, such as Besley [1985] do suggest that, in industries with entry, eventual overshifting is more likely.
At the dealership level, the motor vehicle industry can be characterized as an imperfectly competitive market with entry. Because the vast majority of cars are bought within seven miles of the consumer's home, the relevant market is a local one. Thus, a state presumably contains a numberof local markets. Table 1 demonstrates there is substantial movement by new car dealers into and out of the markets within a state. Though the overall trend of car dealers during the eighties was to exit, both entry and exit can beobserved.
The ultimate eect of taxes on prices emerges only after the market has time to adjust. Thus, the long run eects are, in fact, the results of interest. In addition, sales taxes change infrequently. The results of this study reect the long-run eects of taxes on motor vehicle prices as the analysis uses primarily cross-sectional variation.
The Data
The primary data source for this paper is the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX). Originally, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' conducted the CEX survey in order to compute expenditure weights used in the construction of the consumer price index (CPI). As a result, the BLS has produced a data set that is unique in its level of detail regarding consumption. The data set includes approximately 5,000 observations peryear, collected from 85 dierent urban sampling areas corresponding mainly to Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas as dened in 1970. 8 Each observation pertains to a consumer unit, comprised of members of a household or other living group that share at least two of three major expense categories: housing, food, or other living expenses.
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Each consumer unit is interviewed for four consecutive quarters, resulting in a rotating panel. Motor-vehicle purchases, however, are typically infrequent, making the panel aspects of the data irrelevant; the dataset, eectively, is a repeated cross-section.
The revolving nature of the CEX generates twelve months of information for a household that can begin at any point within the calendar year. In order to link scal data with the CEX, I must pick the appropriate calendar year for each respondent. The relevant year is assigned to be the year that contains the most months covered by the respondent's answers. For example, a consumer unit that is surveyed from November, 1987 to October, 1988 will be considered an observation in 1988. I use observations within the calendar years 1983 to 1989. This time period is the most useful because the Tax Reform of 1986 completely phases out the interest deductibility in 1990, and the home equity became another popular form of deduction.
In a study that looks specically at motor-vehicle consumption, Goldberg [1993] nds the CEX to berepresentative of the U.S. population both in terms of socioeconomic data and in terms of motor vehicle consumption patterns. Moreover, Cutler and Katz [1991] scrutinize these data and conclude that the spending information appears accurate but the income data may be under-reported. To illustrate the data, Table 2 presents summary 8 They also survey several rural areas but they provide no geographical information about these respondents. As a consequence, they are not included in this study. This appears to be a minor omission for the purposes of our study, h o w ever, as Bresnahan and Reiss [1985] note that the vast majority of new cars are bought in urban areas.
9 For a description of these categories, see the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics [1985] , p. 132.
statistics from the CEX for the general survey, for only those who bought new cars, and for only those who nanced a new car purchase. The table demonstrates that within the CEX, six percent of the respondents bought a new car. Of the new car buyers, 77 percent nanced their purchase. Those who purchased new cars tended to have a slightly higher level of income and nondurable consumption. On average, a consumer who nanced a new car purchase was younger and had a lower level of nancial assets compared to the whole population of new car buyers. The CEX contains a substantial amount of information on the stock of motor vehicles owned and purchased by each household, in addition to information on household characteristics and general spending patterns. The data includes information on the make, model, model year, and purchase year of each vehicle. Using information on the vehicle characteristics, the car purchase was linked with model information from the Ward's Yearbooks (1983 Yearbooks ( -1989 . The remainder of the section provides further explanation of variable construction, with a concise list of variables provided in Appendix I.
The Construction of Policy Variables
This paper analyzes the extent to which car prices reect the tax code by exploiting the variation in tax rates across states. I supplement the CEX data with the scal data necessary for the estimation by using information on the state of residence and the year of the purchase. Two key tax variables are necessary for this project: the income tax rates, which inuence the magnitude of one's deductions of interest rate payments for a motor vehicle purchase, and the sales tax rate. Signicant Features of Fiscal Federalism published annually by the Advisory Council on Intergovernmental Relations is the primary source of information for the tax code. The State Tax Handbook provided a check for the data and lled any gaps in the available years of information. Table 3 presents a sample of the tax rates for 1987; the sales tax rate in 1987 varies across states with a range of two to eight percent. Sales tax rates are rarely changed; one year of data presents an adequate picture as most of the tax variable's variation in this data is cross-sectional. Indeed, even in their panel estimation, Besley and Rosen [1994] nd that their sales-tax rate variation is primarily cross-sectional.
The sales tax rate variable, st , is the rate applicable to the purchase of a motor vehicle in state s at time of purchase t, measured in percentage points. In most states, this rate equals the general sales tax rate but this is not uniformly true, as can beseen in Table 3 . Given the lack of information about purchase location, I assume that the vehicle is purchased in the state where the respondent resides. An article in Ward's Reports (July 1995) reports that most consumers purchase their vehicle within seven miles of their residence, a fact that suggests my assumption is reasonable. In addition, it is noteworthy that the BLS makes the same assumption when they impute the sales tax.
The other key tax variable is a measure of the income tax savings that results from the tax deductibility of interest. This requires several pieces of information. First, we need to compute the relevant income tax rates at both federal and state level ( F and S ). Following the actual tax code as reprinted in the IRS publication, Statistics of Income (SOI), I construct the necessary variables for the NBER TAXSIM model to produce F and S . 10 The NBER TAXSIM utilizes sixteen variables in determining a reasonable approximation of the respondent's tax rates. First, I denote the relevant y ear as the year that contains the most months covered by the respondent's answers. For ling status, married couples are assumed to le jointly while others are split accordingly into single and head of household categories. The number of dependents is set to be the maximum of two measures, the numberof children under 18 or the number of family members, excluding household head and spouse, who are not considered earners. The number of age exemptions is set to be the number of taxpayers over 65. Several income measures are used in TAXSIM. The wage and salary measures are entered separately for head of household and spouse in order to take account of second earner exemptions in early sample years. Dividend income is estimated to bethe sum of interest earned, dividends, royalties, estates and trusts. A measure of other income includes earnings of the self-employed, fellowships, rental income, and alimony. TAXSIM uses the measures of pension income and social security income separately, a s w ell as information on transfer income such a s w elfare, food stamps, and unemployment compensation. TAXSIM also accounts for the amount s p e n t on rent, property taxes, and child care when calculating potential credits and deductions. Finally, T AXSIM utilizes an estimate of deductible expenses.
The CEX provides sucient detail regarding expenditures to construct a measure of deductible expenses, excluding property and income taxes. I include health care expenditures and occupational expenditures that exceed the thresholds set by the federal tax code. In addition, sales tax was deductible prior to 1986. The tax forms in these years, found in IRS publications, provided optional sales-tax tables for a standardized sales-tax deduction based on family size, before-tax income and state of residence. The taxpayer had the option of deducting an amount greater than the amount determined by the sales tax table if receipts were kept. Using a measure of total consumption and state sales tax rates, I computed an estimate of all of the sales taxes that the household paid. Moreover, I accounted for sales-tax exemptions for clothing, food, health care and utilities. If my estimate of sales-tax paid exceeded the optional deduction by more than ve percent, I used my estimate instead of the optional amount. The estimate of itemized deductions also includes charitable giving and eligible interest payments.
I avoid potential endogeneity problems with this variable by excluding motor vehicle sales taxes and interest payments from the list of deductible expenses. In doing this, I have constructed the tax savings variable for the rst dollar of interest payments.
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The relevant tax rate depends on the household's itemizer status. Comparing the estimate of itemized deductions that I calculate for TAXSIM to the standard deductions reported in the SOI, I determine a dummy v ariable for itemizer status (I). With the 1986 Tax Reform, the interest deduction was phased out between 1987 and 1990. So each year, a declining fraction of the actual amount spent on interest could bededucted (ph). The state income tax codes regarding the interest deduction follow the federal tax code. The relevant tax saving rate is
I then compute a standard measure of the real after-tax interest rate (R) for consumer i using the new car nance rate for a 48 month loan at commercial banks (lrate) and the rate of ination at time t, ( _ p t ).
R ist = ((1 TaxScale ist ) lrate t ) _ p t :
Information on Motor Vehicle Purchases
The actual transaction price for each car purchase must be computed from several variables available in the CEX. The variable construction here is similar to that in Goldberg [1996] . For respondents who nance their motor vehicle purchase, I compute the actual transactions price as the sum of the down payment and the principal amount borrowed. As shown earlier in Table 2 , roughly three quarters of the respondents who purchase a new car nance their motor vehicle purchases. For those who do not nance their purchase, I compute the transaction price by adding the net purchase price after trade-ins and the trade-in allowance received. It is implicitly assumed here that the dealer does not oer concessions to the consumer in the form of an articially high trade-in oer. Given the lack of specic data on the used vehicles that are traded in, it is impossible to determine whether bargaining between the consumer and the dealers aects the trade-in value of the old car. An adjustment to the price must bemade as the purchase price reported in the CEX includes sales tax. The vast majority of respondents, close to ninety percent, do not provide the sales tax information and BLS imputes this additional expense. They impute this tax amount using the general sales tax rate rather than motor vehicle sales tax rate, assuming that the vehicle was purchased in the state of residence.
12
In order to control for dierences between the car models, I include the suggested retail price, ListPrice, in the regression analysis. I use information from the Ward's Yearbook and match the list prices to the make and model recorded in the CEX. The information provided by the CEX sometimes lacks precision because of the existence of multiple versions of one model. In cases where there was diculty making a precise match, I matched the purchased vehicle to the list price of the most basic and inexpensive model. To control for purchases of a better version of a model, I include all other available variables provided by the CEX on features of the actual car purchased. The features include automatic transmissions (Autotran), air-conditioning (Air Cond), number of cylinders (C y l q ), power brakes (Pwr Brake), and power steering (Pwr Steer). The list price used here includes destination fees, and hence, any indirect implications of the size of the price markup will dier from the results of Goldberg [1996] , where the data exclude destination fees.
The Household Data
The estimation of equation (7) also requires information about household characteristics. The remainder of the section will describe the household data which includes information about the household's stock of cars.
In this study, I use several measures of the nancial status of the consumer unit, income (Income), nancial assets (Fin Assets) and nondurable consumption (Consume). Nondurable consumption is the best available measure of permanent income. My methodology for constructing this variable follows Attanasio [1995] . Non-durable consumption is dened as total consumption minus expenditure on housing, health care, education and durable commodities. For those respondents that complete all four interviews, I dene annual consumption as the sum of the twelve reported months of non-durable expenditures. These consumer units with complete interviews are then used to generate simple seasonal factors by regressing consumption on monthly dummies. For incomplete observations, I then use the seasonal factors to scale the available information into an annual gure. In a price equation, measures of wealth or income may h a v e a positive eect on price, measuring the likelihood that a buyer will purchase extra, unobserved, features for the car which boosts its price. In contrast, measures of wealth or income may proxy for abilities that are correlated with bargaining ability, and thus may b e negatively linked with price.
I also include other household characteristics such as age (Age) and education (Education) of the head of the consumer unit. As mentioned above, to the extent that these characteristics measure bargaining ability or the likelihood of being an informed consumer, we w ould expect a negative relationship with transaction price. On the other hand, an older, more educated person with a higher permanent income may purchase extras that are unmeasured in this data, resulting in a positive relationship.
Though not the primary focus of this paper, I control for the eect of possible dealer discrimination on transaction prices{the focus of Goldberg [1996] . The specication includes dummies for both female-headed households (Female), and minority-headed households (Minority). One limitation of these variables is that the CEX does not indicate which memberof the consumer unit made the actual purchase. Implicitly, the use of these variables assumes that the head of the household makes the motor vehicle purchases.
I add regional dummies to control for potentially important regional variation: rst, price may vary due to delivery fees, which vary by region; second, buying patterns may vary by part of the country suggesting the need to control for local demand. This dummy controls for some of the large variation in price across regions but does not eliminate all of the variation across states through the tax code. Yearly dummies, the unemployment rate, and U.S. income per capita control for uctuations in the overall economy.
To account for a consumer's brand loyalty that may inuence the transaction price, the estimation strategy uses dummies for those that did not own a car at beginning of their survey (First Car), and consumers who repeatedly buy the same brand (Loyal). This eect has been found in earlier work; Goldberg [1996] reports that the price elasticities of demand vary for dierent t ypes of consumers. Intuitively, consumers making their rst car purchases tend to bemore responsive to price, and tend to bethe target of more rebates from the dealerships. Consumers of more than one of a specic brand of car are less price responsive and more likely to have traded in a vehicle.
Several sets of dummies control for a multitude of eects, including the varying degree of popularity of the brands which aects the price markup. Specically, I include brand dummies, and dummies for the dierent classes of vehicles such as Luxury, Truck, Van, Sport Car and Compact. For brevity, I also use a dummy that excludes all specialty cars, Not Specialty, specically it excludes trucks, vans, sport utilities and luxuries. Following Goldberg [1996] , I also control for the model year by creating dummies that reect the time of year and whether the consumer bought last year's model, this year's model or next year's model.
Results
Because the data used in this study are household data rather than the more aggregated data used in similar tax studies, a dierent empirical approach is necessary. Specically, the majority of the households in the CEX cannot be used in the price equation (7) because they did not purchase a new car. Estimating equation (7) in the standard way limits the sample to the fraction of the households making a new car purchase and could introduce a sample selection bias. To remedy the selection problem, I estimate Equation (7) using the data described in the previous section and a maximum likelihood estimation approach for sample selection (see Greene [1990] pp. 739-750) described in Appendix II.
The results from estimating Equation (7), using methodology described in Appendix II and the data described earlier, are reported in Table 4 . Several variants of the estimation are presented as a check for robustness. A comparison of the results shows that the inclusion of year or brand dummies do not aect the coecients of interest, though likelihood ratio tests reject the null hypothesis that the two set of dummies can beexcluded{making the third column the preferred specication. As shown in the table, the coecient on is signicantly dierent from zero, suggesting that controlling for sample selection bias is necessary.
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The value of implies that the respondents with unobservable characteristics that make them more likely to purchase a car also have unobservable characteristics that make them more likely to get a l o w er price.
By utilizing the dierences in tax codes across states and time, I derive the relationship between the after-tax real interest rate and price. The results suggest that the transaction price responds signicantly to the real after-tax interest rate; the coecient o n R is negative and signicant i n all specications. The parameter estimates imply that a one percentage point increase in the real after-tax interest rate will prompt, on average, a price markdown of $106. This implies that consumers pay a slightly higher price for a car when the real interest rate falls or the tax subsidy to interest payments rises. The following simple example puts the result in perspective. Suppose a consumer buys a car for $10,000, roughly the average real price of a car in this sample, and nances the purchase with a ten percent down payment. The results suggest that this consumer would pay $106 less for a new car if the real after-tax interest rate were one percentage point higher. For simplicity, I ignore discounting in this example. As described, the drop in price would more than oset the additional interest payments as a result of the interest rate increase, if the purchase was nanced for one year. If the purchase were nanced for four years, close to the average length of nancing, then the price reduction would only oset about half of the increase in interest payments.
In addition, the results in Table 4 , together with equation (9) provide evidence of an overshifting of taxes onto prices in the motor vehicle industry. Specically, the coecient on st is positive and signicant a t t h e one percent level in all four specications. Though not presented, results that also use the interactions of the sales tax rate with dummies for all of the motor vehicle categories suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that 1 is equal across most types of motor vehicles. The category for compact cars, however, has a signicantly smaller coecient, shown in the second row of Table 4 . In fact, an F-test suggests that the overshifting parameter for compact cars is not signicantly dierent from zero at the ten percent level. This nding is not inconsistent with the ndings in Bresnahan and Reiss [1985] that both manufacturers and dealers have substantially less market power in the markets for the cheaper, compact cars compared to high-valued cars. Bresnahan [1981] explains that there are more substitutes within the compact category and, thus, the margins are smaller.
As shown in equation (9), the overshifting parameter, , is approximately 1 =p if the tax rate is relatively small. Using the mean price of a vehicle in each category, Table 5 presents the overshifting parameter for several categories of motor vehicles. The table uses the appropriate coecient from the fourth column of Table 4 and the mean price in its category to compute . Given the results, the dierences across the motor vehicle categories (with the exception of compact cars) stem only from dierences in price. Any that is greater than zero implies that the tax is overshifted. Table 5 illustrates that taxes are estimated to signicantly overshift for the all categories of motor vehicles, except for Compacts. For example, the overshifting parameter for a luxury car is 1.19 which implies that a change in the tax rate that generates $1 of revenue pervehicle sale increases q, the tax-inclusive price, by $2.19.
Turning back to Table 4 , other results are noteworthy. Changes in list price do not translate one-for-one into a change in the transaction price. With regards to specic features of the car, the results are sensible; the presence of extra features, such as Air Cond, Pwr Steer, and Pwr Brake signicantly increased the price of a car. The other characteristics, such as the numberof cylinders and automatic transmission do not have signicant coecients; I could not reject the null hypothesis that these variables had zero eect in the equation so for the sake of brevity, the coecients are not reported. Transactions prices are also signicantly higher for specialty v ehicles including trucks, vans, luxuries, and sport utilities. I, however, could not reject the null hypothesis that the price markup was the same for the four specialty categories of vehicles. For brevity, I report a single coecient for vehicles that are not in a special category, Not Specialty.
Regarding household characteristics, education and the measures of wealth are the only variables that have a signicant eect on the transaction price. The negative and signicant coecient o n b o t h Education and Income may reect the consumer's negotiating abilities, suggesting that, perhaps, the more educated consumer is better able to extract rents from the dealer. Both the nondurable consumption and nancial assets variables have a positive relationship with price. This may suggest that wealthier consumers are buying options for their car that are not observed in the data.
Like Goldberg [1996] , I nd that the average cost of a car does not signicantly depend on a household-head being female or a minority. These characteristics, as well as age and variables describing the consumer's car stock w ere insignicant and not reported. The sets of dummies variables for region, year, brand, and timing of purchase are all important controls which are included in the regressions but not reported. Among these controls, there were a few noteworthy results. I nd that the cost of a car is signicantly less in the Midwest and signicantly less for last year's model. The results for the unemployment rate and U.S. income per capita, controlling for overall economic conditions, were mixed and mostly insignicant.
Because an in-depth analysis of the decision to buy a car is beyond the scope of this paper, I relegate the selection equation to the end of the paper, in Table 9 . Despite the simple approach of this equation, the results provide some sensible implications and warrants further study. First an increase in the after-tax real interest rate or the sales tax rate slightly reduces the probability of buying a car. The current measures of income have little bearing on the likelihood of a car purchase while nondurable consumption, a better measure of permanent income, does. More education, adults in the household, or earners in the household increase the likelihood of purchasing a car. The number of cars in the 20 household before a new purchase also has a positive relationship with the transaction price. The coecient for the dummy for the consumer units that have no car suggests that those without a car are far less likely to purchase a new car while consumers with several of one brand of car, Loyal, are more likely to make a purchase. The numb e r o f c hildren under 16 in the consumer unit, has a negative eect on the likelihood that the family will buy a new car.
Further Issues and Results
In this section, I extend the results of the previous section in several ways. First, I examine two potentially important sources of omitted variable bias that may confound the results{ local tax systems and heterogeneity across states in the form of average income. I then test the sensitivity of my results to the choice of estimation technique. Finally, I examine the determinants of the nancing terms of a new car purchase to have a complete picture of the eect of government intervention on the overall cost of a new car.
State Heterogeneity
An omitted variable bias is one concern regarding the results of the previous section. Such a bias of the coecients could creating misleading policy implications. Heterogeneity across states might cause such a bias. For example, wealthier regions of the country may have higher overall demand for vehicles and, as a result of local market conditions, pay more for a car. If the relatively wealthier states also tend to have higher sales tax rates, then the positive coecient o n st may only reect the omitted variable bias. To c heck for evidence of this problem, I add a state per-capita income measure to the fourth column of Table 4 . This variable represents the real income per capita within the state of residence at the time of purchase. The coecient on state income is insignicant and does not inuence the parameters of interest. A likelihood-ratio test does not reject, at the ve percent level, the null hypothesis that this variable may beexcluded from the equation. Thus, there is no evidence that this form of bias is driving the key results.
Local Taxes
Due to a lack of information on the precise location of residence, it is impossible to assign the appropriate amount of local taxes applied to a new car purchase. As a result, both municipal and county sales taxes and property taxes are excluded from the regressions shown earlier. Note that BLS imputes the taxes for most purchases in the CEX facing the same diculties and takes the same approach. The exclusion of these local taxes may b e a possible source of omitted variable bias that could aect the results. If states with higher sales tax rates also tend to be states with more local taxes, then the positive coecient o n st may reect the missing variable and not overshifting. I explore this possibility with state level scal data. Because the data varies little over time, I use only one year, 1987, for my analysis. The available measures of local taxes include dummy v ariables for states that contain localities that impose a sales tax or property tax on motor vehicles. Fewer than half of the states impose at least one form of local taxes. To test, I regress the tax indicators on the state population, state income per capita, and the sales tax rates for motor vehicles. The rst two columns of Table 6 present results from probit regressions using two tax indicators. The results provide no evidence that states with high sales taxes are more likely to impose local taxes.
As an additional test, I examine the median local sales tax rate as another measure of the local tax burden within a state. If the state has no local sales taxes, then the median is simply zero. A tobit regression, similar to the regressions of the rst two columns of Table ( 6), provides no evidence that states with high sales tax rates have high local taxes. These results suggest that it is not unreasonable to assume that the omitted variables for local taxation are uncorrelated with the variables used in the analysis above and, thus, do not bias the results.
Empirical Methodology
I present alternative estimation techniques to illustrate that the results are not sensitive to the choice of methodology. First, I run equation (7) using OLS instead of a sample selection model. The results, presented in Table 7 , are not dierent from the results of Table 4 in any substantive way. The lack of dierence suggests that the sample selection approach does not change the results despite the fact that the estimate of in Table (4) is signicantly dierent from zero, which rejects the null hypothesis that controlling for the bias is unnecessary. The OLS results do provide a useful comparison to results with generalized Huber-White standard errors that correct for intra-cluster correlation.
14 This form of bias may be problematic in studies using the CEX because the survey is one with random interviewing within pre-determined sampling areas. It is possible that the variance of some variables is smaller within a sampling area than between sampling areas. As a consequence, the standard errors may beunderestimated. To correct for this bias, I compute the more robust standard errors using the state of residence as a close proxy to sampling areas. The results, shown in Table (7) suggest that the standard errors do look slightly dierent, but not in a way that would change our interpretation of the signicance of the variables of interest.
Evidence on Financing
Both dealers and manufacturers may alter the nal cost of a new car not just with price but with nancing terms. Because the price of a car is not the only factor aecting the cost to the consumer for a new car, I also examine the eects of scal and monetary policy on the nancing terms of motor vehicle purchases. Anecdotal evidence often suggests that the motor vehicle industry does indeed oer special nancing deals, as well as rebates, to entice consumers. Table 8 presents the results of estimations that are similar to those described in the previous section but with price replaced by a series of dependent v ariables that capture the nancing situation of a car purchase: the self-reported real after-tax interest rate, the length of the nancing period in years, the amount of the down payment, and the ratio of the down payment to the purchase price. The rst stage results are shown at the end of the paper, in Table 9 .
The results in Table 8 suggest that the sales tax rates have no signicant eect on the nancing rate or the down payment. The eect on the nancing period appears signicantly dierent from zero, but trivially so. The results in the rst column also suggest that the self-reported interest rate charged moves in line with the 48-month bank rate, as the coecient on the R is essentially one, providing no evidence that nancing terms are part of the negotiations. The other noteworthy results include the eect of R on the size and relative size of the down payment, shown in the third and fourth columns. The real aftertax interest rate does have a positive eect on the relative size of the down payment. Nonetheless, there is no clear empirical evidence to signicantly support the notion that most consumers simultaneously get price reductions and improved nancing terms.
6 Conclusion
This study has utilized the variation in the tax codes across states and data from the CEX to produce results that suggest that both the sales tax rate and the after-tax real interest rate inuence the price of a new car. Thoroughly examining the actual decision to make a new car purchase is beyond the scope of this study, and it will bethe subject of future research.
While interpreting the results, it is worth noting that motor vehicles purchases are unique; consumers must register new vehicles and, hence, cannot avoid taxes by crossing state borders. Nonetheless, the results are still useful. Motor vehicle purchases are still a nontrivial portion of one's total consumption bundle and an important industry in the economy.
The empirical results of this paper have provided evidence that sales taxes are overshifted onto the price of a new car, a result that is consistent with models of tax incidence in imperfectly competitive markets. The parameter estimates suggest that motor vehicle prices, except in the case of the compact car, increase by more than the amount of the sales tax. In the case of the compact car, a product with less market power than other motor vehicles, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that price increases are just equal to the amount o f t h e sales tax.
The evidence of overshifting highlights the fact that studies of tax burdens, such as the CBO study of value-added taxes, may underestimate the tax burden to the consumer when using the standard assumption that price increases are just equal to the amount of a newly imposed sales tax. Underscoring the importance of understanding the potential burdens of excise taxes, a recent study (Metcalf [1995] ) suggests that the government will be forced to search for additional taxes, such as a consumption tax, in its eort to reduce the decit.
In addition, the results imply that a one percentage point increase in the real after-tax interest rate will trigger a markdown of $106 in the price of a new car. There is little evidence to suggest that special nancing terms tend to accompany these price reductions. With regards to scal policy, the subsidies to car purchasers through the interest deduction from one's income tax appear to have given car dealers unintended rents, suggesting that the recent elimination of these subsidies extracted these rents. With regards to monetary policy, the results have similar implications; an increase in the interest rate translates into some reduction in price per vehicle transacted, which translates into a prot loss for either the dealer or the manufacturer in their eorts to promote sales. Notes: First two columns are parameter estimates for equation (7) with OLS standard errors. Last two columns are parameter estimates with Huber-White standard errors, correcting for intra-cluster correlation. The data are described in Appendix I. There are 2,202 observations. Several variables described in the text are included in the estimation as controls, but are not reported. Notes: Estimates from the regression equation of the sample-selection procedure described in Appendix II for equation (7). The data are described in Appendix I. First stage results from column (1) are reported in Table 9 . Table 4 and column (1) of Table 8 . The data are described in Appendix I.
37

